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1. INTRODUCTION

The German Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt,
hereinafter FCO) is the authority responsible for the
enforcement of the German Law Against Restraints of
Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen,
hereinafter GWB).' Although the formation of the GWB was
strongly influenced by American antitrust laws, the
application of the law by the FCO differs significantly from the
enforcement of the antitrust laws in the United States. In
contrast to the United States, where the application of the
antitrust laws is influenced to a large degree by the public
policy of the current administration, the application of the law
in Germany proceeds in a strictly legalistic manner. The FCO
is not generally perceived as a political 'entity.
Germany's purely legalistic approach to competition law is
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limited, however, by the inherent vagueness of the laws that
regulate competition. Because there is no accepted definition
of what competition means, the laws designed to protect it are
by necessity vaguely worded. This places a limitation on the
legalistic application of competition law because it requires
that certain policy decisions be made. As a result, there is a
struggle between the entities responsible for the enforcement
of the law and the political agencies who want to control the
results of the application of the law. In the case of the FCO,
this conflict is illustrated in its relationship with the federal
government as well as the European Commission. Tension
exists in both relationships primarily because of the struggle
between what the FCO considers the objective legal
application of the GWB on the one hand and its political
instrumentalization by the federal government and the
European Commission on the other. This article is written to
give an overview of the FCO and its attempts to apply
Germany's competition law in a purely legalistic manner.
2. THE GERMAN COMPETITION LAW AUTHORITIES
2.1. The Institutions
There are five bodies which play a role in competition law
in Germany. According to the GWB, the three governmental
bodies (Kartellbehdrden)which share regulatory power over
competition are the FCO, the Federal Minister for Economics
(Bundesministerfllr Wirtschaft), and the various state cartel
offices. 2 The fourth authority mentioned in the GWB, the

2 § 44 GWB. The state cartel offices, unlike the FCO, are integrated into
their respective state economic ministries so that the political independence

that exists at the federal level does not exist at the state level.

See

WERNHARD MOSCHEL, RECHT DER WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN

690

(1983). The relationship between the FCO and the state cartel offices differs
from the relationship between the American federal and state antitrust
authorities. First, Germany has only one competition law which is applied
by the various state competition authorities as well as the FCO. Second, the
state cartel offices view their task as being complimentary to that of the

FCO rather than as following an independent policy directed by their
respective state governments. For further discussion of the state cartel

offices and their relationship to the FCO, see Gerhard Hitzler, Die
Abgrenzung der Zustdndigkeitsbereiche des Bundeskartellamtes und der
Landeskartellbeh5rdennach § 44 Abs. 1 Nr.ld GWB, 29 WUW 733 (1979);
Karl-Heinz von Kohler, Behirdenkonkurrenzim Kartellrecht,79 DEUTscHES
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Monopolies Commission,' is not a government agency and has
no decision-making authority. The courts also play a role in
private civil cases, but are required to operate in close
connection with the FCO.4
2.1.1. Federal Cartel Office
The FCO is the most important actor on the German
competition law scene. It has jurisdiction in cases where the
effect of the particular restraint of trade extends beyond the
territory of one of the federal states of Germany." Unlike in
the United States, where the respective jurisdictions of the
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission often
overlap, the FCO does not share enforcement authority with
any other federal agency. In certain cases, however, the
decisions of the FCO may be made ineffective by the Federal
Minister for Economics.6
The decisions of the FCO may be appealed to the court in
which the FCO has its offices-the Berlin Kammergericht.'
Within the Berlin Kammergericht, there is a special chamber
(Senat) set up solely to handle competition law cases.8 This
results in a great deal of expertise in the judicial review of
administrative decisions which does not exist in the United
States. The decisions of the Berlin Kammergericht may then
be appealed to the German Supreme Court which also has a
Senat responsible for competition law matters."

VERWALTUNGSBLATT 214 (1964).
3

§ 24(b) GWB.
See § 90(1) GWB. Another actor on the competition law scene in
Germanyis the European Commission which has jurisdiction over restraints
of trade that affect trade between Member States.
'

'

§ 44(lXlXd) GWB. The so-called "effects test" is used to determine

whether the restraint extends beyond the territory of a state. See § 98(2)

GWB.
' See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
7 See § 62(1) GWB.
•See § 92 GWB.
GWB.
'See Law:
§ 95
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2.1.2. FederalMinister for Economics
The second most important government agency in the
enforcement of German competition law is the Federal
Minister for Economics (hereinafter FME). The legal authority
of the FME in the application of the GWB is limited to three
instances. 0 First, if a cartel agreement which is prohibited
by Section 1 of the GWB does not fall within one of the
exceptions provided in Sections 2 through 7 of the GWB, the
FME has the authority to permit the cartel if "the restraint of
competition is necessary for predominating reasons concerning
the general economy and the common welfare."" Second, the
FME may authorize an export cartel in the context of Section
6(1) of the GWB. 2 No prior decision of the FCO is required,
and the firms may apply directly to the FME for an exemption
to form an export cartel. Third, and perhaps most important,
3
is the so-called minister authorization (Ministererlaubnis).
According to this provision of the GWB, the FME may approve
a merger that has been prohibited by the FCO if the restraint
of competition is outweighed by advantages to the economy as
a whole or if the merger is justified by a predominate public
interest.
2.1.3. State Cartel Offices
In addition to the FCO, most states (Lander)have their
own competition law agencies. The state cartel offices have
jurisdiction in those cases which do not fall within the
jurisdiction of the FCO or FME."' Because the FCO has
jurisdiction over restraints of trade that extend beyond the
territory of a state, 5 and the size of the German states are
on the average not much larger than a typical U.S. county, the
state competition law offices have jurisdiction only in cases
involving small companies with local influence. In cases where
a state cartel office does have jurisdiction, the applicable law
* See § 44(1)(2) GWB.
n § 8(1) GWB. This is the so-called Ministerkartell.
12 § 44(1)(2) GWB.
13

See § 24(3) GWB.

14

See § 44(1)(3) GWB.

"I§ 44(I)(1)(d) GWB. See Zustandige Kartellbeh6rdebei Miflrauch eines
linderiibergriefendenDemarkationsvertrages,30 WuW 692, 693 (1980).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss3/3

1993]

GERMAN FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE

is the GWB since the states do not have their own competition
laws as in the United States.
The relationship between the state cartel offices and the
FCO is horizontal in that the FCO has no authority over the
state cartel offices and their spheres of jurisdiction are
exclusive. The FCO has jurisdiction only in those cases
specifically listed in Section 44(1) of the GWB.' 6 In all other
cases, the state cartel offices have jurisdiction." In addition,
the FCO and the state cartel offices are required to notify one
another if either undertakes an investigation or initiates a
proceeding against a firm."8 If an investigation or proceeding
is undertaken by a state cartel office as well as the FCO, the
state cartel office must cede jurisdiction to the FCO if one of
the bases of jurisdiction of the FCO listed in Section 44(1) of
the GWB exists. 9

" The duties and powers assigned to the Cartel Authority by this Act
shall be exercised by:
1. the Federal Cartel Office (§ 48)
a)
in respect of cartels within the meaning of §§ 4, 6 and 7,
insofar as these functions have not been conferred upon the
Federal Minister of Economics;
b)
with regard to agreements as designated in § 16 and
recommendations as designated in § 38a;
c)
in respect to mergers under §§ 23 to 24a, insofar as these
functions and powers are not conferred upon the Federal
Minister of Economics;
d)
if the effect to the market influence, of conduct in restraint
of competition, of discriminatory conduct, or of a
competition rule extends beyond the territory of a state;
e)
in respect to the Federal Postal Administration and the
German Federal Railways;
2. the Federal Minister of Economics in the cases of§ 8 and § 12(2) in
connection with § 6(1) and in § 24(1) in conjunction with
subsections (3) to (5);
3. in all other cases, by the highest state authority competent
according to state law.

§ 44(1) GWB.
17 See § 44(1)(3) GWB.
* § 45 GWB.
*' § 45(3) GWB. For further discussion of the jurisdiction of the FCO and
stateLaw:
cartel
seeRepository,
Hitzler, 2014
supra note 2.
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2.1.4. Monopolies Commission
The competition law body with the least formal authority
in Germany is the Monopolies Commission which was
established by the second reform of the GWB in 1973." The
Monopolies Commission consists of five members"1 who are
usually the leading experts in the field of competition law and
who are nominated by the federal government and confirmed
by the federal president. 2 It is a highly independent body
whose members cannot be members of a state or federal
government or legislature."
The Monopolies Commission,
which has no decision-making authority, is charged with the
duty of assessing the current state of market concentration,
evaluating the application of Sections 22-24a of the GWB, and
suggesting amendments to the GWB when deemed
necessary."'
The Commission's primary task is to draft
reports in response to requests from the federal government
concerning a particular sector of the economy or industry.
Although reports drafted by the Monopolies Commission have
no formal authority, they are extremely influential in Germany
because of the stature of the Commission's members. In many
instances, suggestions made by the Monopolies Commission
become the focus of public debate and serve as stimuli for
legislation.
2.2. The Structure of the Federal Cartel Office
2.2.1. The Internal Structure of the FederalCartel Office
The FCO came into existence with the introduction of the
GWB which became effective on January 1, 1958.5 The
internal structure of the FCO as well as its jurisdiction and

20

§ 24b GWB.

21
22

§ 24b(1) GWB.
§ 24b(6) GWB.

" § 24b(2) GWB.

24

See § 24b(3) GWB. The biennial reports ofthe Monopolies Commission

contain summaries in English attached as appendices. In 1987, the
Commission issued a single volume collection of these summaries. See
MONOPOLKOMMISSION, GERMAN MONOPOLIES COMMISSION 1973-1983 (1987).
2'Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrainkungen, 1957 BGBI 11081 (F.R.G.).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss3/3
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authority are governed by the GWB.2" The FCO is comprised
of a President, ten Decision-Divisions (Beschluflabteilungen)
(each with its own jurisdiction over a particular branch of the
economy), a Fundamental Policy Division subdivided into five
departments, a European and International Division
subdivided into three departments and an Appeals Division."'
The staff of the FCO has grown from 137 in its first year of
operation 8 to the current staff of approximately 250.29
a. The Office of the President
The head of the FCO is the President who is appointed by
the FME. The FCO has had only three Presidents in its
thirty-five year history: Eberhard GUnther, Wolfgang Kartte
and the current President Dieter Wolf. The unwritten policy
is to appoint someone from outside the FCO. The current
President, as well as his predecessors, was appointed from the
staff of the FME.
The President of the FCO has little decision-making
authority. In fact, he has no authority to decide individual
cases. Indeed, the power of the President lies primarily in his
administrative and operational authority. Perhaps the most
important is the President's authority to determine the
distribution of competencies among the Divisions of the FCO.
Subject to the approval of the FME, s0 the President of the
FCO can determine the composition of the Divisions as well as
the cases for which each Division is responsible."'
In addition, the President determines the operational rules
of the FCO. 2 This means that the President is responsible
2,§ 48 GWB.
7 See Appendix.
2

8

See BERICHT DES BUNDESKARTELLAMTES OBER SEINE TATIGKEIT IM

JAHRE 1973 SOWIE OBER LAGE UND ENTWICKLUNG
AUFGABENGEBIET, DRUCKSACHE 1000 (1959) at 12.
21

AUF

SEINEM

Wernhard M5schel, Neuere Entwicklungen im deutschen Kartellrecht,

25 JuRISTISCHE ARBEITSBLATTER 52, 52 (1993).
" Siegfried Klaue, in GESETZ GEGEN WETrBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN

1779 (Ulrich Immenga et al. eds., 2d ed. 1992).
31 Kurt Markert, DieRolle des Bundeskartellamtesbei der Durchsetzung
des Wettbewerbsrechts in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in
INSTITUTIONEN UND GRUNDFRAGEN DES WETrBEWERBSRECHTS 9, 15 (Uwe

Blaurock ed., 1988).
32 § 48(2) GWB.
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for daily procedures within the FCO and can institute policies
as he sees fit. For example, the weekly meeting of the
Divisions (Abteilungsleiterkonferenz), at which the Divisions
summarize their current developments was instituted by
former FCO President Kartte. The meeting serves to inform
the President of the current operations of the FCO and allows
him a forum in which he can voice his opinion on specific
cases.
Finally, the President has the responsibility for publicly
representing the FCO. He is in contact with the other
branches of the government and with the public through
speeches and interviews. This often gives the false impression
that he is the decision maker at the FCO.
b. The Decision-Divisions
The real decision-making authority of the FCO lies in the
ten Decision-Divisions.3 3
The directors of the DecisionDivisions, like the President, are appointed by the FME for
life"' and cannot be members of any company boards, trade
or industry associations, or any other professional
organizations.3 5 This ensures a degree of independence from
politics and industry. Generally, the directors of the DecisionDivisions are life-long civil servants (Beamter) who have
worked their way up through the ranks of the FCO.
The Decision-Divisions are divided according to industry,
with each Division being responsible for cases in their
assigned industries. For example, the Sixth Division handles
cases involving the printing, copying, tobacco, cultural arts,
film, and advertising industries.
If it is unclear which
Division is to handle a case, it is worked out informally
between the Division directors themselves. Each Division has
a director (Vorsitzender), four to six assistant directors
(Beisitzer), and two to three assistants (Referenten). Within
the Divisions themselves, the specific industries are divided
between the assistant directors. In the case of the Sixth
" Id. The number of Decision-Divisions was increased from nine to ten
in 1991 as a result of the increased workload created by the reunification
process. See Bundeskartellamt auf 10 Beschlupabteilungen erweitert, 1
WuW 4 (1991).
34 § 48(4) GWB.
36 § 48(5) GWB.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss3/3
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Division, for example, cases in the tobacco industry are
assigned to one particular assistant director. One intended
result of this organizational structure is that a great deal of
specialization occurs within the Divisions concerning a
particular industry."
Once an assistant director has been assigned a case, she is
referred to as the "reporter" (Berichterstatter) and is
responsible for drafting a preliminary decision. Final decisions
in individual cases are made by a majority vote of the Division
head and two assistant directors."s The Division director and
the responsible reporter are automatically included in the
decision. The second assistant director is pre-determined in
the sense that each reporter has a fixed secondary reporter
and also serves as a- secondary reporter for one of her
colleagues. This avoids any politics that would be possible if
the Division director were able to decide who casts the third
vote. Theoretically, the primary reporter must only persuade
one of her colleagues since the vote of the Division director is
equal in weight to votes of the assistant directors. In practice,
however, even when the primary reporter secures the vote of
one of the other two, the third person may force an oral
discussion if she decides against the other two. This seldom
happens because the opinion of the individual reponsible for
the case is usually accepted by the other two.
The Decision-Divisions are entirely independent from one
another. What influence there is comes in the form of informal
discussion between the "reporter" and those in other Divisions.
The weekly meetings mentioned above provide an important
forum for the exchange of information and ideas not only
between the President and the Decision-Divisions, but also
among the Divisions themselves. During the meeting, each
Division presents a summary of its activities to which the
other Divisions may ask questions or, more commonly, add
their comments.

Klaus Weber, Geschichte undAufbau des Bundeskartellamtes,in ZERN
JAHRE BUNDESKARTELLAMT

BEITRAGE zu FRAGEN UND ENTWICKLUNGEN

AUF DEM GEBIET DES KARTELLRECHTS 263, 267 (1968).
GWB.
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c. The Fundamental Policy Division
The most important function of the Fundamental Policy
Division is to insure legal uniformity (Rechtssicherheit)in the
application of the GWB. .The independence of the DecisionDivisions both from the President and from. one another
carries with it the danger of inconsistent decisions. As
discussed above, the Decision-Divisions are separated by
induistries rather than according to the type of restraint of
competition involved. Each Decision-Division is responsible for
the application of the entire GWB. As such, there are ten
different sources of interpretation of the same provision of the
GWB.
There are several ways in which this threat to legal
uniformity is addressed. First, the authority to apply new
laws or amendments to the GWB is usually concentrated into
several Decision-Divisions for the first years after its
enactment. For example, in the first five years of the merger
law, introduced in 1973, its application was concentrated in
three Decision-Divisions.3 8 Second, it is the responsibility of
the Fundamental Policy Division to assist on questions of
general policy. The Departments of the Fundamental Policy
Division are separated not by industry, like the DecisionDivisions, but according to the particular type of restraint of
competition involved. They have no decision-making authority
but make non-binding recommendations to the other Divisions.
The final practice which increases legal uniformity is that
there is a certain degree of stare decisis that exists within the
FCO. Past decisions hold significant weight even if they were
made by a different Decision-Division.
d. The European and International Division
The primary function of the European and International
Division of the FCO is to coordinate contacts with the
European Community and other foreign competition law
agencies such as the Unite States Department of Justice and
the United States Federal Trade Commission. This Division
is becoming increasingly important because of the
S8

See BERICHT DES BUNDESKARTELLAMTES OBER SEINE TATIGKEIT IM

JAHRE 1973 SOWE

OBER DIE LAGE

UND

ENTWICKLUNG AUF SEINEM

AUFGABENGEBIET, DRUCKSACHE 7/2250 (1974) at 9.
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globalization of industries and the integration of Europe. The
increasing amount of transnational business activity requires,
in the absence of a supranational competition law authority,
the coordination of enforcement practices of the national
competition law agencies." In 1976, the United States and
Germany signed a cooperation agreement concerning the
application of competition law to international business.'0
One of the functions of the European and International
Division is to oversee and implement the cooperation provided
for in this and other such agreements."
Another development which gives this Division added
importance is the growing influence of European competition
law. As the European competition law system matures, the
number of cases which fall within the European Commission's
jurisdiction is increasing."2 As the EEC Commission assumes
more influence in competition law matters, the role of the
European and International Division becomes more important
because it is the channel through which the FCO can make its
position known to the Commission.
The Commission is required to transmit copies of
applications and notifications to the Member States' relating
to Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome." In addition,
" See David J. Gerber, Foreword: Antitrust and the Challenge of
Internationalization,64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689, 703-04 (1988).

" See Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland und der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika uber
die Zusammenarbeit in bezug aufrestriktive Geschaftspraktiken, 1976 BGBl
II 1711 (U.S.-F.R.G.), reprintedin 15 I.L.M. 1282 (1976).
41 In addition to the agreement with the United States, Germany has
also signed a bilateral agreement with France concerning the coordination
of the enforcement of competition law. See Abkommen zwischen der
Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung der
Franz6sischen Republik uiber die Zusammenarbeit in bezug auf
wettbewerbsbeschriinkende Praktiken, 1984 BGBI II 758 (F.R.G.-Fr.).
41 The jurisdiction of the Commission extends to those cases which may
affect trade between Member States. See Case 247/86, Alsatel v. Novasam,
1988 E.C.R. 5987, 6008 para. 11. There is widespread agreement that this
requirement is merely a formality and presents no significant hurdle when
the Commission wants to prohibit certain business conduct. See VOLKER
EMMERICH, KARTELLRECHT 512-13 (6th ed. 1991); MARTIN HIRSCH & THOMAS
BURKERT, KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-KARTELLRECHT 119 (4th. ed. 1993).

, See Regulation 17 of the Council of 6 February 1962 Implementing
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, Art. 10(1) 1962 J.O. 13 204, 207,
(hereinafter Regulation 17).
SeeLaw:
Treaty
Establishing
the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25,
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the Commission must consult an Advisory Committee on
Restrictive Practices and Monopolies prior to making a final
decision. 45 The Advisory Committee is comprised of officials
from the Member States. The Commission must supply the
Advisory Committee with a draft decision upon which the
Advisory Committee has the authority to issue its opinion.4"
The European and International Department is also
responsible for representing Germany at the meetings of the
Advisory Committee.
e. The Appeals Division
As indicated above, the decisions of the FCO may be
appealed to the Berlin Kammergericht.47 The decisions of the
Berlin Kammergericht are then appealed to the Senat of the
German Supreme Court responsible for competition law
matters. 48 The Appeals Division is responsible for appeals to
the German supreme court, while the individual DecisionDivisions or the Vice-President of the FCO are generally
responsible for appeals in the first instance.
2.2.2. The Position of the FederalCartel Office
in the Government
Although the FCO is a branch of the FME,49 it enjoys a
high degree of independence not only from the government, but
also from the business community.50
The geographical
separation of the FCO, which is located in Berlin in accordance
with the GWB,51 from the FME, which has its offices in Bonn,
symbolizes the independence of the FCO.52
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) (hereinafter EC Treaty).
41 See Regulation 17, supra note 43, at art. 10(3).
46 Id. at art. 10(6).
47 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
48 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
49 § 48(1) GWB.
' Several authors have suggested making the FCO an entirely
independent agency. For a discussion of these proposals, see Wolfgang
Kartte, Wettbewerbspolitik im Spannungsfeld zwischen
Bundeswirtschaftsministeriumund Bundeskartellamt, in WETTBEWERB IM
WANDEL 47, 56 (H. Gutzler et al. eds., 1976).

5 § 48(1) GWB.
52 This independence is further symbolized by the upcoming move of the
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss3/3
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The President of the FCO and the division heads are
nominated for life terms by the FME and cannot be a member
of a board of directors, a cartel, or a business or trade
association."S Unlike in the U.S., the top officials at the FCO
do not change when the government changes and are not
perceived as policy-makers but rather as civil servants who
objectively apply the law.54 In order to avoid the danger of
a Division director using his life-term appointment to maintain
a fiefdom within a Division, former President Kartte developed
a system of rotation whereby the Division directors
periodically change Divisions.55
2.3. Administrative Proceedings
Formal administrative proceedings by the FCO to enforce
the GWB are seldom necessary because most alleged violations
are settled through discussions with the firms involved.5"
Where an agreement cannot be worked out with the parties,
however, the FCO may institute administrative
proceedings. 7 The FCO has ex ante authority to prohibit
conduct that it deems would violate the GWB. The FCO may
also act ex post to either break up a completed merger" or
impose fines (Bul3geld).5"
In practice, however, the
imposition of fines plays only a minor role."0
Given the value of business secrets in German business,
perhaps one of the most feared powers of the FCO concerns its
investigatory authority. The FCO, as well as the state cartel

FCO's headquarters to Bonn in response to the move of the FME from Bonn
to Berlin. See Verabschiedung von Wolfgang Kartte als Prasident des
Bundeskartellamtes-Einfihrungvon Dieter Wolf, 42 WUW 567, 570 (1992).
53 § 48(5) GWB.
"Infra Section 3.
See RolfGeberth, Das Spannungsfeldzwischen Wirtschaftsministerium
und Kartellamt, 36 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 295, 297 (1991).
" See Emmerich, supra note 42, at 500.
67 Administrative proceedings conducted by the FCO are governed by
§§ 51-58 of the GWB.

53 § 24(2) GWB.
" §§ 38-39 GWB. Private parties injured by conduct which violates one
of the provisions of the GWB intended to protect another person may bring
a cause of action for compensatory damages or an injunction. See § 35(1)

GWB.
Emmerich,
supra
note 42,2014
at 497.
Published by "See
Penn Law:
Legal Scholarship
Repository,
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offices and the FME, can demand information from businesses
concerning their business relations"1 or can conduct an onsite investigation of documents 2 with the permission of a
judge."3 Unlike the broad investigatory powers enjoyed by
the European Commission," there must be a "concrete initial
suspicion" before the FCO can resort to its investigatory
powers.6 5
The FCO's access to documents which contain business
secrets is a sensitive issue in German competition law,66
because business secrets are closely guarded in Germany.
Even in litigation, German businesses are not forced to open
their files to the same extent as their U.S. counterparts. In
addition, German civil procedure does not include the process
of discovery as it is known in the United States."'
Of particular importance to practitioners is the opportunity
to get an informal opinion from the FCO concerning a planned
merger.68 Parties intending to enter a merger contract may
at a very early stage report their plan to the FCO and ask for
an informal opinion. Usually the FCO will ask for documents
and statistics and will issue a non-binding opinion to the
firms. Many cases are dealt with this way and it partially
explains why the percentage of reported mergers that are
prohibited by the FCO is extemely low. The advantage to the
firms is that the FCO does not charge fees for the opinion

6*§ 46(1)(1) GWB.
,2I
at (2).
6' See id,at (4).
14 For a discussion of the investigatory powers of the European
Commission, see CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY & GRAHAM D. CHILD, COMMON
MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 527-31 (1987); LENNART RITTER ET AL., EEC
COMPETITION LAW, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 607-661 (1991); Marcus
Schriefers, Die Ermittlungsbefugnisse der EG-Kommission in
Kartellverfahren,43 WUW 98 (1993).
"Decision
of May 15, 1984, Kammergericht Berlin, W. Ger., 91
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen 178, 184 (1985).
" See Otfried Lieberknecht, Die Behandlungvon Geschdftsgeheimnissen
im deutschen und EG-Recht, 38 WuW 833 (1988).
" For a discussion of the pre-trial collection of information in Germany,
see David J. Gerber, ExtraterritorialDiscovery and the Conflict of
ProceduralSystems: Germany and the United States, 34 AM. J. COMP. L.
745, 748-769 (1986).
0S This process is not provided for in the GWB but arises out of the
administrative practice of the FCO.
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(which differs from a formal notice), the position of the FCO
can be ascertained at a relatively early stage in the
negotiations (thus avoiding potentially wasted costs), and the
decision of the FCO remains confidential.
3. THE APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF COMPETITION
LAW IN GERMANY

The application of competition law is inherently political
for two reasons. First, the institution which the laws are
intended to protect, competition, is largely undefinable.
Second, as a form of market regulation, the enforcement of
competition law creates incentives for politicians to influence
its application."9 The fact that there are few clear lines in
the application of competition law makes it difficult to identify
correct results and as such to preclude the political
instrumentalization of the law."0 The more indefinite the
terms of the statute, the greater the potential for political
influence in the application to specific cases. The open nature
of competition law, that is, the inability or unwillingness of the
legislature to codify precise definitions and standards, leads to
a continuing degree of tension between policy goals on the one
hand and the objective legal application of the law on the
other. This tension is particularly accentuated in Germany
because of (1) the methodological approach to the application
of the GWB and (2) the order-policy approach to competition
law in Germany.
3.1. The Systematic Application of Law in Germany
The application of civil law in Germany follows a specific
methodology which is the fundamental tool of the German
jurist. First, the facts are gathered and their relevancy
determined. Second, the appropriate legal norm that is to
serve as the basis for the claim (Anspruchsgrundlage) is

o See generally WILLIAM SHUGART, ANTITRUST POLICY AND INTEREST
GROUP POLITICS (1990).
" See Wernhard Mbschel, The Goals of Antitrust Revisted, 147 J. INST'L
& THEOR'L ECON. 7, 9 (1991) ("Excluding a core area of'naked' restraints of
competition, the demarcation between practices which promote competition
and those which hinder it has remained a field in which reasoned analysis
and mere speculation exist in equal measure.").
Published
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sought.
Each claim has specific elements
(Tatbestandsmerkmale)which must be fulfilled. The third step
is the subordination of the facts under the legal norm.7 The
legal consequences are methodologically drawn from the law.
The process of arriving at a legal consequence from a set of
facts is therefore seen as a purely legalistic method and is
taught as such in the law schools.7 2 A German jurist learns
that there is a particular legal solution for each situation and
the process of arriving at this solution simply requires the
application of the legal methodology. This deductive, dogmatic
approach to the law ensures, or at least reduces the risk that
the values of the entity applying the law will play a role.
The methodology employed in applying the GWB is the
same as that of civil law in general.7" A particular business
conduct is identified, a particular provision of the GWB is
sought, the elements of that norm are tested against the facts,
and the legal consequences are then automatically derived
from the law. The FCO, which is entrusted with the
application of the GWB, is thus perceived merely as the
instrument by which the legal results are arrived at and not
as a policy-making body.
3.2. The Order-policyApproach to Competition Law
Because of the complexity and undefinability of
competition, "laws regulating market activity need to be
formulated flexibly.7 4 This troubles German jurists 5 who

" This step is referred to as the subsumtion and is defined as "[tlhe
subordination of a fact pattern under a legal norm." CREIFELDS
RECHTSWORTERBUCH 1129 (11th ed. 1992). For further discussion, see KARL
LARENZ, METHODENLERRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 155-65 (6th ed. 1991).
" For further discussion of the German approach to law, see Max
Rheinstein, The Approach to German Law, 34 IND. L.J. 546 (1958); Folke
Schmidt, The German Abstract Approach to Law, 9 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES
IN LAW 131 (1965).
73 ULRICH IMMENGA & ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMACKER, GESETZ GEGEN
WETrBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN 41, 49 (Ulrich Immenga & Ernst-Joachim
Mestmdcker eds., 2d ed. 1992); WERNHARD MOSCHEL, RECHT DER
WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN 79-80 (1983).
74 See CORWIN D. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION: REQUISITES OF
A GOVERNMENTAL POLICY 42-49 (1949).
7

1 See,

e.g.,

Eberhard

Giinther,

Die

Auslegung

unbestimmter

Rechtsbegriffe des GWB, in WETTBEWERBSORDNUNG IM SPANNUNGSFELD VON
WIRTSCHAFTS-UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT. Festschriftf-dr Giinther Hartmann
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are used to having a precise legal solution ascertainable

through the implementation of the methodology described
above."6 When the wording of the GWB does not lead to a
precise legal solution, the decision-maker looks to its context
and purpose. The application of competition law in Germany
has been influenced primarily by the Ordo-liberals" who
provided the conceptual basis for the GWB.7 ' According to
this school of thought, the activity of the state concerning
economic policy "should be directed at securing the order of the
economy, not at the steering of the economic process."" Like
classical liberalism, it considers the market as the most
efficient allocator of scarce resources. However, as one of the
leading Ordo-liberals, Walter Eucken, pointed out, it differs
from "the classical tradition" in that it envisages a positive
role for the state in securing the order.8 0
Perhaps the most important positive role of the state was
in maintaining the competitive order (Wettbewerbsordnung).
The two types of norms required for this task were called

123, 123 (1976) ("The analysis of the GWB indicates that the legislator in
this law failed to fulfill every expectation that is to be expected of a
codification."); Gerd Pfeiffer, Grundfragen der Rechtskontrolle im
Kartellverfahren (Auslegungsmethodik - unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe Verfahrensrecht), in SCHWERPUNKT DES KARTELLRECHTS 1978/79, 1, 4-5
(1980).
70 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
7 For a general discussion of Ordo-liberalism, see Alan Peacock & Hans
Willgerodt, Overall View of German Liberal Movement, in GERMAN NEOLIBERALS AND THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY 1 (Alan Peacock & Hans
Willgerodt eds., 1989); David Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy:
GermanNeo-Liberalism, CompetitionLaw and the "New" Europe, 41 AM. J.
COMP. L. (forthcoming 1993); Herbert Giersch, Liberal Reform in West
Germany, 39 ORDO: JAHRBUCH FOR DIE ORDNUNG VON WIRTSCHAFT UND
GESELLSCHAFT 17 (1988); Manfred Streit, Economic Order,PrivateLaw and
PublicPolicy, The FreiburgSchool ofLaw and Economics in Perspective,148
J. INST'L & THEOR'L ECON. 675 (1992).
78 See supra note 28, at 11; Wolfgang Kartte & Rainer Holtschneider,
Konzeptionelle Ansatze und Anwendungsprinzipien im Gesetz gegen
Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen - Zur Geschichte des GWB, in HANDBUCH DES
WETTBEWERBS 193, 199-210 (Helmut Cox et al. eds., 1981); Wernhard
Mbschel, Competition Policy from an Ordo Point of View, in GERMAN NEoLIBERALS AND THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY 142, 149-50 (Alan Peacock &
Hans Willgerodt eds., 1989); Mischel, supra note 29, at 52.
7
9 WALTER EUCKEN, GRUNDSATZE DER WIRSCHAFTSPOLITIK 336 (5th ed.
1975).
'* Walter Eucken, Das ordnungspolitischeProblem, 1 ORDO: JAHRBUCH
FOR DIE ORDNUNG VON WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 56, 80 (1948).
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constituting principles (konstituierende Prinzipien) and
regulating principles (regulierendePrinzipien). The former are
designed to establish the competitive order,"1 while the latter
are designed to maintain a functionally competitive order
(funktionsfdhige Wettbewerbsordnung).2 Once the market is
established, the state acts passively in the sense that it
ensures that competition exists but does not intervene to
achieve particular results.
This conception of the function of competition law-the
maintenance of a competitive order-contrasts, for example,
with the French conception of competition law as an
instrument for securing economic goals rather than merely
maintaining the competitive order.8 3 The use of competition
law to achieve specific public policy goals is strictly limited in
Germany."
The fundamental principle of German
competition law is that "the GWB does not empower the
entities which are charged with the application of the law to
firms involved in restaints8 of
competition to apply the law for
5
economic policy purposes."
3.3. Implications
The methodological application of the GWB when combined
with the Ordo-liberal approach to the interpretation of
competition law means that there is little room for what is
referred to as "non-competitive" (auflerwettbwerblichen)
objectives.8 6 The approach to competition law in Germany
S1 EUCKEN, supra note

79, at 254-55.

82

Id. at 291.
8' See Bernard Clement & Jean Guy~not, French Law/Commentary, in
COMPETITION LAW IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE USA, FR.C-I, FR.C-3
(Douwe Gijlstra ed., Supp. 1982 ); Mschel, supra note 70, at 9-10; Moschel,
supra note 73, at 28. For a discussion of the application of the French
competition law, see generally V.G. VENTURINI MONOPOLIES AND
RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES IN FRANCE (1971); Frederic Jenny, French
CompetitionPolicy in Perspective, 1987 FORDHAM L. CORP. L. INSTITUTE 301
(Barry Hawk ed., 1988); Philippe Nouel, French Competition Law, in
TOWARDS 1992-THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TRUST 152
(Julian Maitland-Walker ed., 1989).
84 One prominent exception is the ability of the FME to allow a merger
on public policy grounds. § 24(3) GWB.
85 IMMENGA & MESTMACKER, supra note 73, at 42.
88 Otto Schlecht, Entscheidungsliniender deutschen Wettbewerbspolitik,
43 ORDO:
JAHRBUCH FOR DIE ORDNUNG VON WIRTSCHAFT UND
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represents a refusal to recognize that its application is
influenced by public policy. The politicians are responsible for
the policy; the jurists are responsible for the application of the
law. This approach to law is based on the assumption that
legal terms and standards promulgated by the legislature are
precise. The inherently open nature of competition law is illsuited for closed legal systems such as that existing in
Germany.
In addition, the Ordo-policy approach to law assumes that
there is a difference between government interference in the
market and the maintenance of competition by the
government. According to the dominant view of the role of
competition law, the GWB is directed at the promotion and
maintenance of a market economy.8 7
"A different
understanding would give the agencies responsible for the
application of the GWB political decisions which they have no
legitimacy to make." 8
Therefore, the application of
competition law should not include public policy.8 "
This
approach is supported by German scholars who consistently
reject the "instrumentalisation" of the GWB to achieve specific
social or economic goals."0
This approach to competition law inevitably gives rise to
conflicts since the application of competition law is inherently
political due to the indefinability of the concept of
competition" and the economic effects following from its
regulation. The tension arising from the refusal to recognize
the political content of competition law is illustrated in several
relationships the FCO has with certain more politically
responsive entities.

GESELLSCHAFT 319, 322 (1992).
s7 See IMMENGA & MESTMACKER, supra note 73, at 41.
s'Mbschel, supra note 73, at 79-80; see also IMMENGA & MESTMACKER,
supra note 73, at 49.
" Mschel, supra note 29, at 52 ("[The FCO] follows a strict rule of law
and not a system of discretionary political decisions.").
"See IMMENGA & MESTMACKER, supra note 73, at 52.
See Meinrad Dreher, Verrechtlichung und Entrechtlichung
Gesetzgebung und Gesetzesanwendung im Kartellrecht,2 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
GESETZGEBUNG 312, 320 (1987) ("The dynamic and complex character of
competition makes the general regulation of concrete competitive behavior

more difficult.").
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.

[Vol. 14:3

4. THE FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE AND PUBLIC POLICY
A purely legalistic approach to competition law inevitably
results in a certain degree of friction between the entity
responsible for the implementation of the law and those
governmental entities who are politically responsible for the
results of the market. This type of friction is apparent in the
relationships the FCO has with other entities involved in the
regulation of business and the German economy in general.
4.1.

The Relationship Between the FederalCartel Office and
the FederalEconomics Ministry

The German competition law jurists often refer to a
"natural relationship of tension" between the FCO and
FME 2 This tension exists because the FCO is technically in
3
a subordinate role (Unterordnungsverhdltnis)
in its
relationship with the FME.
Whereas the FME is a
governmental cabinet, and as such is politically responsive, the
FCO is perceived as being bound "only by the instruction of the
law and not by instructions of the economic policy arm of the
executive."9 4 Accordingly, conflict arises in those cases in
which the FME attempts to manipulate the competition for
political purposes.
The FME can exercise its administrative authority over the
FCO in four ways. First, it has the authority to issue general
instructions to the FCO.9 5 The precise meaning of this clause
is an issue in German competition law. There is agreement
among the German competition law scholars that it empowers
the FME to issue general directives concerning the application
of the GWB to certain categories of cases."8 However,
whether the FME can issue directives in individual cases is a

,2 KARTTE, supra note 50, at 50; Geberth, supra note 55, at 296.
Klaue, supra note 30, at 1782.
Fritz Rittner, Das Ermessen der Kartellbeharde, FESTSCHRIFT FOR
HEINZ KAUFMANN ZUM. Geburtstag 307, 320 (Bartholomeyczik et al. eds.,
1972).
"6See § 49 GWB; see also, Directive of May 30, 1980, concerning the
treatment of foreign mergers, Bundesanzeiger Nr. 103, June 7, 1980,
translatedin HEIDENHAIN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 375.
so Klaue, supra note 30, at 1782-83.
'

"
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point of controversy.9 7 Although the GWB does not expressly
indicate whether the FME can issue directives in individual
cases, the prevailing opinion in Germany is that such
directives are impermissible.9 Therefore, authority to issue
directives has little practical significance since it is seldom
relied on.99
The second administrative power that is granted to the
FME by the GWB is the authority to establish the DecisionDivisions of the FCO. 1°° Although the operational rules of
the FCO are determined by its President, they require the
approval of the FME.1 0'
The third authority is the ability to attach comments to the
bi-annual reports of the FCO.10 2 Every two years the FCO
is required to publish a report summarizing its activities as
well as other developments within its sphere of authority"'
The FME can attach comments to this report stating its
position on the issues discussed in the report to indicate how
its position differs from that of the FCO.' °" The practical
effect of this is that it allows the FME to publically question
the policy of the FCO.
The last authority concerns the ability of the FME to
resolve conflicts between the FCO and other agencies. The
FCO can impose a fine in the insurance, banking, or savings
and loan industry only in agreement with the repective
governmental agencies which are responsible for regulating
these branches."
If the FCO and the respective agency
cannot come to an agreement, the FME has the authority to
decide.
More important than the administrative authorities of the
FME is its authority to intervene in the application of the

EMMERICH, supra note 42, at 498.
" Id,at 498; Klaue, supra note 30, at 1783; MOSCHEL, supra note 73, at
97

688.
" The FME has issued only five general directives of which only two
carry any significance. See Klaue, supra note 30, at 1782.

'"See § 48(2) GWB.
lZId.
11 See § 50(2) GWB.

'*sSee id. at (1).
'"See id. at (2).
§ 44(2)
GWB.
Published by'"See
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substantive law. As indicated above, the FME has direct
authority in the application of the GWB in three instances:
the authority to prohibit an export cartel;... the authority to
permit a merger if it concludes that the benefits of the merger
outweigh the effect of the reduction in competition;" m and
the authority to permit a cartel that falls within Section 1 of
the GWB if the restraint of competition is necessary for
overriding reasons connected with the economy as a whole and
the public interest.'0
Tension is most likely to arise when the FME relies on its
power over the FCO to pursue industrial policy objectives that
conflict with the dogmatic application of the GWB by the FCO.
The FME is politically responsible for the success of the
economy. Its interests are therefore not necessarily in
maintaining a competitive market, but rather in the short
term success of the economy as defined by the electorate. The
case of the appropriate level of market concentration provides
a good example. In April 1989, the FCO refused to grant
permission to a merger between Daimler-Benz and
Messerschmitt-B6lkow-Blohm GmbH because of the market
concentration the merger threatened to bring about. 1' The
FME, however, saw the merger as enhancing the international
competitiveness of the two German companies and
subsequently issued an authorization essentially overriding

10 See § 44(2) & (8) GWB. The authority to declare an export cartel void

was granted because of the foreign relations implications of such
agreements. See Klaue, supra note 30, at 1745.
0
' 7 See § 24(3) GWB. An additional authority of the FME over the FCO
concerns mergers which fall under the European Merger Control. When a
merger threatens to create a dominant position in the Member State, that
state may ask the Commission to cede jurisdiction to it even though the
merger technically falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission.
See infra notes 136-41, and accompanying text. Since the FME is
responsible for actually making the request to the Commission, it can
essentially prevent the FCO, which typically takes a harder stand against
mergers than the Commission, from ruling on the merger. This informal
authority was exercised recently in the case of a merger between two of the
leading German potash mine companies which the FME was concerned that
the FCO would prohibit. See Die Kali-Fusionskontrollebleibt bei der EGKommission in Brilssel, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Aug. 7, 1993,
at 9, col. 3.
log See § 8(1) GWB.
...See Untersagung eines Zusammenschlusses wegen Entstehens und
Verstarkung, marktbeherrschenderStellungen, 7 WuW 633 (1989).
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the FCO's decision.110
Such political intervention in the application of the
competition law, which in the United States would probably
not raise an eyebrow, is the source of what is referred to as the
"natural relationship of tension"' between the FCO and
FME because it conflicts with the conception of a purely
legalistic approach to competition law.
4.2.

The Relationship between the FederalCartel Office and
the Treuhandanstalt

The delicate balance between politics and the apolitical
application of the GWB by the FCO was tested in the process
of transforming the planned economy of East Germany into a
market oriented economy. The first step in this process was
the privatization of the state-owned industries.
These
industries were converted into joint-stock companies whose
shares were turned over to a government agency called the
2
Treuhandanstalt."
According to the Treaty on the
Establishment of German Unity,"3 the task of the
Treuhandanstaltwas either to privatize the firms under its
control, to rehabilitate the non-marketable firms so that they
could be sold, or to liquidate those firms that could not be
rehabilitated."" Where a buyer could not be found, the
*" See Ministererlaubnisfur ZusammenschluB Daimler-MBB, 10 WuW
803 (1989). Since the merger provisions were introduced into the GWB in
1973, there have been two ministerial authorizations, three ministerial
conditional authorizations, one partial authorization, four denials, and five
applications were withdrawn before a decision was reached. For a discussion
of each of these applications, see Erfahrungsbericht des
Bundeswirtschaftsministeriums iiber Ministererlaubnis-Verfahren bei
Firmen-Fusionen,11 WuW 925 (1992).
..See supra note 90.
"" See Gesetz zur Privatisierung und Reorganisation des volkseigenen
Verm6gens, 1990, § 1(4) at 300, GB1 (1990).
11 See Treaty on the Establishment of German Unity, Sept. 28, 1990,
BGBI. II 889 translated in 30 I.L.M. 457 (1991) (hereinafter, Unification
Treaty).
114 For a discussion of the activities of the Treuhandanstalt,see George
Akerlof et al., East Germany In From the Cold: The EconomicAftermath of
Currency Union, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1, 65-75 (1991);

Michael Gruson & Georg Thoma, Investments in the Territory of the Former
German Democratic Republic, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 540 (1990-1991);
Herbert Hax, Privatization Agencies: The Treuhand Approach, in
PRIVITIZATION. SYMPOSIUM IN HONOR OF HERBERT GIERSC 143 (Horst
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decision whether to rehabilitate or close down a business had
serious political repercussions because of the ensuing
unemployment."'
Since the economic integration of East Germany preceded
the political integration by seven months, the FCO did not
have immediate legal control over business practices in
eastern Germany. Accordingly, the West German government
included a clause in the Treaty Establishing a Monetary,
Economic and Social Union requiring the East German
n6
government to enact legislation regulating competition.
The subsequent legislation, which was virtually identical to
the GWB," 7 granted the East German Office for the
Protection of Competition (OPC) jurisdiction to enforce the
competition law."' Upon political unification, however, the
n
OPC was dissolved and its functions assumed by the FCO.
The FCO made it clear from the beginning that the
transformation of the East Germany economy must take place
in accordance with the GWB. 20 The primary challenge to
the FCO in the reunification process was to prevent private
concentrations of power from replacing the former state-owned

Siebert ed., 1992); Wernhard Mbschel, Treuhandanstalt und Neuordnung
der fruheren DDR Wirtschaft, 20 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR UNTERNEHMENS -UND
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 175 (191); Robert Weimar, Treuhandanstalt und
Privatisierung,44 DER BETRIEB 373 (1991).
"' See Hax, supra note 114, at 149-52.

..See Treaty Establishing a Monetary, Economic and Social Union, June
25, 1990, BGBI. II, 518. For an English translation, see 29 I.L.M. 1108
(1990).

"1See GESETZ OBER DIE INKRAFTSETZUNG VON RECHTSVORSCHRIFTEN DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND IN DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN
REPUBLIK, GB1. DDR PART I Nr.34 p. 3 5 7 (1990). For a detailed discussion
of the legislation, see Werner Kleinmann, Das neue Kartellrecht der DDR,
Recht der InternationalenWrtschaft, 45 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1 (1990).
11 See Resolution of the Council of Ministers Concerning the Office for
the Protection of Competition, May 30, 1990, GBI.I 31, at 281. For further
discussion of the OPC, see Struktur und Besetzung des Amtes fiir
Wettbewerbsschutz der DDR, 40 WUW 739 (1990).
118 See Reinhold Wutzke, 155 Tage fiir Wettbewerbsschutz, 41 WUW 14
(1991). The 7th Decision-Division of the FCO was initially given authority
for cases involving eastern German firms. See Zustdndigkeit im BKartA fir
DDR-Falle,40 WuW 368, 368 (1990).

1 oSee

BERICHT DES BUNDESKARTELLAMTS OBER SEINE TATIGKEIT IM
JAHRE 1991/92 SOWIE OBER DIE LAGE UND ENTWICKLUNG AUF SEINEM
AUFGABENGEBIET, 12/847 BUNDESTAGSDRUCKSACHE, at 4.
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monopolies." 1 The collapse of these monopolies presented
a danger that firms from the West would step into the vacuum
created by the collapse of the state-owned monopolies. As
such, the merger control laws of the GWB were the primary
instrument by which such market dominance was to be
avoided."=
The dogmatic application of the GWB by the FCO conflicted
at times with the political goals of the Treuhandanstalt. In
many instances, the Treuhandanstaltheld stock of marketdominating companies.
The responsibility of the
Treuhandanstaltwas first and foremost privatization, which
meant the sale of the companies.'
The condition of most of
the businesses, however, was such that a significant financial
investment was required to make them competitive. As such,
many business were attractive only to large firms from the
West who already had significant market power.
The
Treuhandanstalt'sgoal to privatize often meant having to sell
a business to a large firm from the West because smaller
investors were not interested, and this conflicted at times with
the policy of the FCO. In certain cases, the FCO's policy
meant that the the Treuhandanstaltcould not sell a business
in its possession to a market dominating investor from the
West, but had to hold on to the business until another investor
could be found.
This did not make the FCO popular, as the case of
Interflug, the East German national airline, illustrates. Soon
after unification, Lufthansa, the West German national
airline, indicated its willingness to purchase Interflug
complete with landing and takeoff rights."
The FCO took

"" See Wolfgang Kartte, Wettbewerbspolitische und kartellrechtliche
Aspekte des deutschen Einingungsprozesses,in FESTSCHRIFT FUR ALFREDCARL GAEDERTZ ZUM 70. Geburtstag 259, 262 (1992); H.W. Sinn,
MacroeconomicAspects of German Unification, in ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
GERMAN UNIFICATION 79, 105 (Paul Welfens ed., 1992).
'" The provisions of the GWB concerning cartels and the abuse of
market dominating positions were of secondary importance in the
reintegration of the eastern German economy. See Kartte, supra note 121,
at 270-72.
11§ 1(1) GESETZ ZUR PRIVATISIERUNG
VOLKSEIGENEN VERMOGENS, 1990 GBI. DDR

UND

REORGANISATION

DES

300.

114 See Erhard Kantzenbach et al., Die Rolle der Wettbewerbspolitik bei
der Transformation des planwirtschftlichen Systems in den neuen
Bundesldndern,
ORDo: Repository,
JAHRBUCH
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a negative position on the proposed sale to Lufthansa since it
would mean the strengthening of Lufthansa's already
dominant position in West Germany. The fact that Interflug
was not immediately sold, led to its liquidation which, in turn,
caused substantial unemployment. In this case, the FCO was
seen as the cause of the liquidation and was forced to take
much of the blame for the ensuing unemployment. 2 '
Because of its strict application of the GWB, the FCO was
also blamed for hindering investment in eastern Germany. In
July 1992, the Treuhandanstalthad entered into an agreement
to sell the former East German oil company Minol
Mineralolhandel AG to the French oil company, Elf Aquitaine.
In the agreement, Elf Aquitaine agreed to invest in the
construction of a new refinery in eastern Germany and in
return it would acquire from the Treuhandanstalt Minol's
distribution network in eastern Germany. 2 ' The political
motives of the German government and the Treuhandanstalt
were clear. They were getting one of the largest European
companies to make a substantial investment in a dilapidated
eastern German industry badly in need of an influx of capital.
The FCO on the other hand was not so responsive to these
political concerns. Its imposition of additional conditions on
the sale caused Elf to protest to the German government who
in turn complained to the FCO. 27 Both cases illustrate the
conflict between the strict legalistic application of the
competition law adhered to by the FCO on the one hand and
the policy objectives of the government on the other.

UND GESELLSCHAFT 301, 312 (1992); Berlin Dogfight, 316 ECONOMIST 88

(Sept.
15, 1990).
12

Streit urn Verantwortung des BkartA fUr Schicksal der Interfiug, 41
WuW 274 (1991); Kantzenbach et al., supra note 124, at 312.
126 The details of the agreement are discussed in 1992 O.J. (C 232) 14.
.. Heino Elfert, Bonn gibt den Druck an das BerlinerBundeskartellamt
weiter, HANDELSBLATT, Dec. 19 & 20, 1992, p.15, col.1.
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4.3.

The Relationship Between the FederalCartelOffice and
the European Commission

4.3.1.

The Authority of the European Commission in
Competition Law Matters in Germany

In many instances, the FCO must share jurisdiction with
the Commission of the European Community over business
practices."' 8
The jurisdiction of the Commission in
competition law matters extends only to practices which may
affect trade between Member States. This requirement has
posed little impediment to the extension of jurisdiction by the
Commission to practices of firms located in one Member
2 9 The result is that a particular business practice in
State."
Germany is often subject to the jurisdiction of the FCO as well
as the Commission. Although the relationship betweeen the
German and European competition law authorities is generally
harmonious,3 0 the political influence in the Commission
decision-making practice often causes a degree of frustration
within the FCO.
4.3.2. The Influence of Politics in Competition Law Matters
There are certain policy differences which have led to
"outright confrontation" between the FCO and the
Commission.' 3 ' This confrontation arises from what the
Germans perceive as the improper influence of politics in the
application of competition law. Whereas in Germany, the
application of competition law is perceived as a legalistic
process, "the thinking in all the other countries of the EEC is

"' See generally K. Peter Mailander, Aufgabenteilung zwischen den
Wettbewerbsbehorden in der Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, in
FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERNST STEINDORFF ZUM 70. GEBURSTAG 1021 (1990).
1
" EmmERICH, supranote 42, at 512-13; HIRSCH & BURKERT, supra note
42, at 119.
IN In addition, there has been what is described as a "mutual
convergence" of substantive provisions of the European and German
competition law systems. See Hans-Peter Schwintowski, Konzept, Funktion
und Entwicklung des deutschen und europdischen Wettbewerbsrechts, 92
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWiSSENSCHAFT 40, 55-74 (1993).
131 Wolfgang Kartte, Offene Mdrkte sind wichtiger als ein Kartellamt,
ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG,
PublishedFRANKFURTER
by Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository,
2014May 26, 1992, at 17, col.1.
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entirely different.""8 2 For example, the Germans take the
position that industrial policy goals should not influence the
way in which competition law is applied, whereas the French
view competition law as "an instrument of state economic
control."'
Two recent events which have received much
attention in Germany illustrate the tension that exists because
of the differing conceptions of the function of competition law.
a. Industrial Policy in the Merger Control Regulation
The first event was the enactment of the European Merger
Control Regulation in 1989.'" The European merger law
applies only to mergers between firms with a combined
worldwide annual turnover of 500 billion ECU (European
Currency Unit), where at least 250 million of the combined
turnover was derived within the European Community and
two-thirds of each of the firms' annual turnover was derived
from more than one Member State.'
If the merger falls

13 Kartte, supra note 122, at 270-72. See also Schlecht, supra note 86,
at 323. ("Dangers also exist at the European level. Some Member States
view competition law as an instrument to achieve concrete, pre-determined
goals. They load this legal field with certain social, labor market or middleclass policy guidelines thereby changing the real function of the competition
law and weakening its function as ensuring freedom. According to this
approach, competition policy would become a policy instrument of the state
to direct the market. This type of industrial policy objectives are
incompatible with our order-policy approach."). Interestingly enough, it was
the French version of Articles 85 and 86 that was adopted into the EC

Treaty. See ALFRED MOLLER-ARMACK, AUF DEM WEG NACH EUROPA 114

(1971).
"3 Wernhard Moschel, Schutzziele eines Wettbewerbsrechts, in BEITRAGE
ZUM HANDELS-UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT. FESTSCHRIFT FOR FRITZ RITrNER
ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 405, 408 (1991).
13 Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 Dec. 1989 on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 14 (hereinafter
Merger Control Regulation).
13 The German merger law, in contrast, applies to mergers involving
firms with a combined worldwide turnover of 500 million Deutsche Marks
in the last completed business year (§ 24(8)(1) GWB), mergers in which at
least one of the firms had a turnover in the last business year of more than
50 million DM (except when one firm had a turnover of at least 4 million
DM and the other at least of 1 billion) (§ 24(8)(2) GWB), or where the
market is effected is one in which goods or services have been supplied for
at least five years and which had a turnover of at least 10 million DM in the
last calendar year (§ 24(8)(3) GWB). Thus, conflicts will arise in very large
mergers over 500 million.
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within the scope of the EEC law, the Commission has
exclusive jurisdiction.'
However, there are two exceptions to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission which are designed to reduce
the Commission's impact on the competition law agencies of
the Member States.""7 First, Member States may have
jurisdiction if certain public interests are at stake such as
public security.'
The second exception is the so-called
German clause," 9 labelled as such because it was inserted
at the insistence of the German government." According to
this clause, the Commission may decide, upon request of a
Member State, that the merger should be handled by the
national competition law authorities because it creates or
threatens to create a dominant position in a distinct market in
that Member State. Its inclusion in the Merger Control
Regulation illustrates the insistence of Germany to maintain
some influence over market concentration in Europe. 41
The enactment of the Merger Control Regulation has led to
"frustration" at the FCO.1' The reason for this is that the
Merger Control Regulation, from the German perspective,
represents a victory of industrial policy over competition
policy."
The Germans see an inherent conflict between

3M

13

Merger Control Regulation, supra note 134, art. 21(2).
Giorgio Bernini, Jurisdictional Issues: EEC Merger Regulation,

Member State Laws and Articles 85-86, in INTERNATIONAL MERGERS AND
JOINT VENTURES, FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 611, 618 (Barry
Hawk ed., 1991).
18 Merger Control Regulation, supra note 134, art. 21(3).
13

Id., art. 9.

'" Leon Brittan, The Law and Policy of Merger Control in the EEC, 15
EUR. L. REV. 351, 355 (1990).
141 Horst Satzky, The Merger Control Regulation of the European
Economic Community, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 923,945 (1990). There have been
only five requests by member states for referals and only one has been

granted by the

Commission.

See Kommission der EuropAischen

Gemeinschaften, XXII. Bericht uiber die Wettbewerbspolitik 1992, 93 KOM

162-70 (1993).
'" Moschel, supra note 29, at 56.
' 4 See MICHAEL TOLKSDORF, EUROPAISCHER BINNENMARKT 1993: VORUND NACHTEILE FOR DEUTSCHLAND UND SEINE PARTNER 106-07 (1991);
Entweder ein Europaisches Kartellamt oder keine Absenkung der
Schwellenwerte, HANDELSBLATT, 27.10.1992, at 5, col.1.; CHRISTIAN
SCHMIDT, DIE "ENTWICKLUNG DES TECHNISCHEN UND WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN
DER KONFLIKT
PublishedFORTsCHRIFTrS".
by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship
Repository,WETTBEWERBSPOLITIK-INDUSTRIEPOLITIK
2014
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industrial policy as inserted in the so-called "French clause"
and competition policy.'" According to the French clause",
the Commission is instructed to take into account, inter alia,
the competition from firms located outside the Community
when determining whether or not a merger should be
allowed."
The opinion of the FCO President, and of the
German legal community in general,"" is that this discretion
invites "the risk of the politicization of the decision-making in
the Commission."" 7 This politicization runs counter to the
German conception of competition law discussed above.
b. The Treaty on European Union
The second event which has added to the frustration of the
FCO was the signing of the Treaty on European Union on
February 7, 1992.148 One of the problems with the Treaty
from the perspective of the German "Ordo-policy" advocates is
that it opens the door for industrial policy like the Merger
Control Regulation." 9 The Treaty extends the activities of
IN

DER EUROPAISCHEN

FusIONSKONTROLLE

(1992); Herbert Edling,

Europaische Fusionkontrolle als Instrument der Wettbewerbspolitik, 22
WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFTLICHES STUDIUM 250, 251 (1993).
144 SACHVERSTANDIGENRAT
ZUR
BEGUTACHTUNG
GESAMTWIRTSCHAFTLICHEN
ENTWICKLUNG,
DIE
INTEGRATION IN DEUTSCHLAND.
PERSPEKTIVEN -

DER

WIRTSCHAFTLICHE
WEGE - RISIKEN,

JAHRESGUTACHTEN 1991/92 (1992) at 211.
"

Merger Control Regulation, supra note 134, art. 2 (1)(a).

'46 SACHVERSTANDIGENRAT

SCHAFTLICHEN

ENTWICKLUNG,

ZUR

BEGUTACHTUNG

DIE WIRTSCHAFTLICHE

DER

GESAMTWIRT-

INTEGRATION

IN

DEUTSCHLAND, supra note 144; Wolfgang Kartte, Zur institutionellen
Absicherung der EG-Fusionskontrolle, 43 ORDO: JAHRBUCH FUR DIE
ORDNUNG VON WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 405, 411 (1992); Ingo

Schmidt, EG-Integration: Industrie-versus Wettbewerbspolitik, 72
WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST 628, 629 (1992); Deutsche Kritik an EGFusionskontrolle,2 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 611

(1991); Uwe Vetterlein, Die Industriepolitik der Europaischen
Gemeinschaft-Implikationender MaastrichterBeschlusse, 18 LIST FORUM
204, 205 (1992).
14" Dieter Wolf, Europdisches Wettbewerbsrecht, 46 WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNGEN 1767, 1767 (1992).
14 Treaty on European Union, done at Maastricht, Feb. 7, 1992, 31

I.L.M. 247 (1992).
'49 See, e.g.,
SACHVERSTANDIGENRAT
ZUR BEGUTACHTUNG DER
GESAMTWIRTSCHAFTLICHEN ENTWICKLUNG, FOR WACHSTUMSORIENTIERUNG -

GEGEN LAHMENDEN VERTEILUNGSSTREIT, JAHRESGUTACHTEN 1992/93 at 24547 (1992); Henning Klodt, Europaische Industriepolitik nach Maastricht,
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss3/3
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the Community to include "the strengthening of the
competitiveness of Community industry."15
This clause,
together with Article 130(1), which calls on the Commission to
actively promote the competitiveness of the European industry,
creates, in the eyes of the Germans, the unwise codification of
industrial policy into the EC Treaty. In its most recent report,
the German Monopolies Commission indicated its
dissatisfaction with this 151
development and called for the
provision."
this
of
"deletion
4.3.3. Efforts to Address the Conflicts
a. Cooperation between Agencies
To a large extent, conflicts between the FCO and the EC
Commission are addressed through the channels of cooperation
that exist between the two agencies. Regulation 17 requires
the Commission to keep the Member States informed of their
activities and gives the Member States the right to express
their views to the Commission."' For example, where a
merger has been reported to the Commission, it will inform the
FCO if the merger affects the German market.
b. Independent European Cartel Office
In addition to attempts at closer cooperation between the
agencies, the conflicts mentioned above have given rise to calls
for the creation of a European Cartel Office independent from

1992 DIE WELTWIRTSCHAFT 263 (1992); Ernst-Joachim Mestmdcker,
Widerspriichlich, verwirrend und gefdhrlich, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG, Oct. 10, 1992, at 15, col.1; Wernhard Moschel, EG-Industriepolitik
nach Maastricht, 43 ORDO: JAHRBUCH FOR DIE ORDNUNG VON WIRTSCHAFT
UND GESELLSCHAFT 415 (1992); Horst Siebert, Die Weisheit einer hoheren
Instanz:Zu den ordnungspolitichenArgernissender Vertrdge von Maastricht
gehilrt auch die Vereinbarung iiber eine europiische Industripolitik,
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Mar. 14, 1992, p.15, col.1; Schmidt,
supra note 146; Lothar Vollmer, Wirtschaftsverfassung und
Wirtschaftspolitik der EG nach Maastricht,46 DER BETRIEB 25 (1993).
'" Treaty on European Union, done at Maastricht, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 3(1)
31 I.L.M. 247 (1992).
'M"MONOPOLKOMMISSION, Hauptgutachten
SPOLITIK ODER INDUSTRIEPOLITIK 17 (1992).

152 Regulation 17, supra note 43, art. 10.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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the Commission.15 From the German position, the problem
at the European Community level is that the responsibility for
stimulating the economy is in the same hands as the
responsibility for controlling the economy, i.e., the
Commission.'" The creation of a independent office along
the lines of the FCO would, according to the FME, ensure that
non-competitive interests (wettbewerbsfremde Interessen) do
not have influence in the decision-making process.155 "The
problem ...

is that there is no European cartel office. If you

don't create such an organization, you're mixing politics and
antitrust issues."' 6
'"See

BERICHT DES BUNDESKARTELLAMTES OBER SEINE TATIGKEIT IN DEN

JAHREN 1991/92 SOWIE fIBER LAGE UND ENTWICKLUNG AUF SEINEM
AUFGABENGEBIET, DRUCKSACHE 12/5200 (1993) at I; Thomas Groger &

Thomas Janicki, Weiterentwicklungdes EuropaischenWettbewerbsrechts,42
WuW 991, 997-98 (1992); Thomas Janicki, Zehn Thesen zur
Wettbewerbspolitik, 40 UNTERNEHMER MAGAZIN 29, Oct. 29, 1992; Wolfgang
Kartte, Chancen und risiken fur den Wettbewerb im EG-Binnenmarkt, in
BEITRAGE ZUM HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTRECHT. FESTSCHRIFT FUR FRITZ
RI ITNER ZUM 70. Geburtstag 251, 260 (1991); Kartte, supra note 146, at 408-

12; Wolf, supra note 147, at 1730 ("The creation of the conditions for the
decentralized application of the European cartel law is long overdue.");
Verabschiedungvon Wolfgang Kartte als Prasidentdes BundeskartellamtesEinfuhrung von Dieter Wolf, 42 WuW 567, 569 (1992).
For the
consitutional issues associated with the creation of such an agency, see
Friedrich Merz, Bedarfdie Errichtungeines EuropaischenKartellamtesder
Anderung des EWG-Vetrages, 1 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 405 (1990).
154 See
Christoph Hauschka, Zielkonflikte zwischen
Unternehmenskontrolle und Wirtschaftsfbrderung in den
wettbewerbspolitischen Programmaussagender EG-Kommission, 40 WuW
205, 216 (1990); Edling, supra note 143, at 251.
155 STELLUNGNAHME
DER BUNDESREGIERUNG
ZUM
BKARTA
TATIGKEITSBERICHT 1989/90 at V. The counterargument made by former EC

competition commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan, is that such an agency would
be exposed to the same political influences as the commission. See Lucy
Kellaway, Skeptics FearDamaging Effect of Conflicting PoliticalInterest,
THE FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 21, 1990, p. 8 . In addition, Claus Dieter
Ehlermann, Director of the Commission's Directorate General IV, points out
that a separate body comprised of officials appointed by the Member States
would be inadequate to deal with the important competition law issue of
state aids because of the national interests involved in such cases. See Ein
Europakartellamt hcitte auch Nachteile,, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG, May 21, 1993, at 17, col.1; Claus Dieter Ehlermann, Fir ein
Europkiisches Kartellamt gibt es zur Zeit noch keinen Handlungsbedarf,
HANDELSBLATT, Jun. 8, 1993, at 7, col.1 ("An independent European Cartel
Office without political oversight is unthinkable.").
'" See German Official Sees Need For Global Antitrust Work, WALL ST.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss3/3
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c. Power Sharing
In an attempt to curb what Germans perceive as the
growing influence of politics in the application of competition
law, they have proposed that the Commission allow the FCO
to handle cases which technically fall within the jurisdiction
of the Commission. 5 ' Some authors, as well as the Federal
Cartel Office itself, rely on the subsidiarity principle that was
inserted into the EC Treaty through the European Union
Treaty to support their argument."' 8 According to Article 3b
of the European Union Treaty, the Community authorities will
act in cases not within their exclusive authority "only if and in
so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore,
by reason of the scale or the effects of the proposed action, be
better achieved by the Community."'
Since the application
of European competition law contained in Articles 85 and 86
of the Treaty of Rome"es does not fall exclusively in the
competence of the Community,' the Germans argue that
J., Dec.
11, 1990, at C18.
1

' See Lionel Barber, German With Plan for EC Glasnost, THE FIN.

TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at 2.
1" See BERICHTDES BUNDESKARTELLAMTES OBER SEINE TATIGKEIT IN DEN

JAHREN 1991/92, supra note 153, at 6; Peter Hort, Briissel buchstabiert ein
Modewort. Zur Entdeckung der Subsidiaritdt,FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE

ZEITUNG, Aug. 28, 1992, at 13; Groger & Janicki, supra note 153, at 1004;
Schlecht, supra note 86, at 331; Dezentralisierung der EGWettbewerbskontrolle, HANDELSBLATT, May 19, 1993, p.5, col.6. Contra
Panagiotis Kamburoglou, EWG-Wettbewerbspolitih und Subsidiaritdt, 43
WuW 273 (1993).
15

Treaty on European Union, supra note 150, art. 3b. For a discussion

of the current debate over the subsidiarity principle, see N. Emiliou,
Subsidiarity: An Effective BarrierAgainst "the Enterprises of Ambition"?,
17 EuR. L. REV. 383 (1992); Markus Heintzen, Subsidiaritdtsprinzipund
Europiiische Gemeinschaften, 46 JURISTEN ZEITUNG 317, 318 (1991)
Waldemar Hummer, Subsidiaritatund Foderalismusals Strukturprinzipien
der Europaischen Gemeinschaften?, 33 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 81 (1992); A.G. Roth, The Principleof Subsidiarity
in the Maastricht Treaty, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1079 (1992); Peter

Schmidhuber, Subsidiaritatim Binnenmarkt, EG MAGAZIN, Dec. 25, 1992;
Subsidiarity: The Challenge of Change. PROCEEDINGS OF THE JACQUES

DELORS COLLOQUIUM (1991).
1

" Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note

44.
1.1Article 88 of the EC Treaty specifically indicates that the Member
States
mayLegal
apply
European
competition
law which is codified in Article 85
Published by
Penn Law:
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Repository,
2014
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the Commission should defer more cases to the Member
States. According to the German Federal Economics Minister:
In the interest of the division of labor between the
Commission and the national agencies, one should
think seriously about loosening the exemption monopoly
of the Commission. In cases with clear national
implication, in which the interests of the Community
diminish, the national agencies must be granted the
authority, not only to find violations as it currently
does, but also to grant exceptions. It does not involve
reducing the authorities of the Commission, but rather
relieving the Commission from its constantly growing
responsibilites through the national agencies.162
The arguments of the Germans have not fallen on deaf
ears. The Commission's competition law commissar has called
for a decentralization of the competition law and the referral
of more cases to the Member States."6 In its most recent

and 86 of the EC Treaty. See also Regulation 17, supra note 43, art. 9(3).
Since the 1990 reform of the GWB, the FCO has had the authority to apply
the competition law provision of the EC Treaty. Until recently, however, the
FCO has not applied European competition law to cases within its
jurisdiction. See BKartA will gegen Strom-Monolpol nach EG-Recht
vorgehen, 43 WUW 180 (1993); Kartellamt will Exklusiueklauseln kippen,
HANDELSBLATT, Feb. 12 & 13, 1993, at 25, col.5. This assumption of the
responsibility for the application of European competition law was at least
in part intended to show the Commission that the FCO is willing and able
to handle cases which affect trade in Germany and which under current
practices would be handled by the Commission.
162 Verabschiedung von
Wolfgang Kartte als Prasident des
Bundeskartellamtes..Einfiihrungvon DieterWolf, 42 WuW 567, 569 (1992).
See also DIETER KRIMPHOVE, EUROPAISCHE FUSIONKONTOLLE 387 (1992)
(arguing that the subsidiarity principle limits the authority of the
Commission in merger cases to ensuring the existence and development of
workable competition in Europe). A similar argument was made by the
President of the FCO in the context of the Merger Control Regulation, "the
Commission should not hesitate for their own benefit, to fill the subsidiarity
principle with life in the future and leave merger cases to the Member
States." Wolf, supra note 147, at 1767. The subsidiarity principle has
limited application to the Merger Control Regulation since it provides for
exclusive jurisdiction for the the Commission in mergers involving
companies of substantial size. See Mailander, supra note 128 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion, see Panagiotis Kamburoglou,
supra note 158, at 274-80.
' Brissel will Kartellverfahren Straffen und an nationale Behorden
delegieren, 43 WuW 4 (1993); Vortrag von Sir Leon Brittan iiber, vDie
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annual report on competition policy, the Commission expressly
indicated that the subsidiarity principle is relevant in the
application of the European competition laws.'" This policy
was recently implemented in a notice which identifies how the
Member States can take a more active role in the application
of European competition law.'
5. CONCLUSION
This article was aimed at providing the U.S. jurist with an
overview of the FCO, its unique approach to competition law,
and some of the most pressing issues it is facing. The purely
legalistic approach to competition law adhered to by the FCO
was used to explain some of the conflicts the FCO has with
other political agencies.
Each relationship exhibits an
inherent tension which stems from the efforts of certain
politically responsive government agencies to achieve results
which would not otherwise follow from the dogmatic
application of the GWB by the FCO. This tension is the
inevitable result of the failure to recognize that the regulation
of competition inherently involves political decisions.
Although there may be general agreement that the regulation
of competition is necessary, there are no universally accepted
models of competition that would facilitate the "apolitical"
enforcement of competition law. Deciding which business
practices and structures should be allowed, and which should
not, is inherently a political decision. This recognition, which
is generally accepted in the United States, as illustrated by
the use of the antitrust enforcement agencies to achieve policy
goals, has not been accepted by the German FCO.

kiinftige Wettbeserbspolitik der EG., 43 WuW 209 (1993).
16 XXII. Bericht Uber die Wettbewerbspolitik, supra note 141, at 74.
65See
Bekanntmachung uaber die Zusammenarbeit zwischen der
Kommission und den Gerichten der Mitgliedstaaten bei der Anwendung der
Artikel 85 und 86 des EWG-Vertrags, 1993 O.J. (C 39) 6.
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